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Abstract
We describe a password generation scheme based on Markov mod-
els built from English text (specifically, Charles Dickens’ A Tale
Of Two Cities). We show a (linear-running-time) bijection between
random bitstrings of any desired length and generated text, ensuring
that all passwords are generated with equal probability. We observe
that the generated passwords appear to strike a reasonable balance
between memorability and security. Using the system, we get 56-
bit passwords like The cusay is wither?" t, rather than
passwords like tQ$%Xc4Ef.
1. Introduction
Users are very bad at choosing passwords.
In order to precisely quantify just how bad they are (and how
much better we would like to be), we use the standard measure of
"bits of entropy", due to Shannon (Shannon 1948). As an example,
a password chosen randomly from a set of 1024 available pass-
words would exhibit 10 bits of entropy, and more generally, one
chosen at random from a set of size S will exhibit log2S bits of
entropy.
In a system using user-chosen passwords, some passwords will
be chosen more frequently than others. This makes it much harder
to characterize the “average” entropy of the passwords, but analysis
by Bonneau of more than 65 million Yahoo passwords suggests
that an attacker that is content to crack 25% of passwords can do
so by trying a pool whose size is 25% of 217.6. That is, the least
secure quarter of users are as safe as they would be with a randomly
generated password with 17.6 bits of entropy (Bonneau 2012).
To see just how terrible this is, observe that we can easily
construct a pool of 77 password-safe characters1, so that a ran-
domly generated password containing n characters will contain
n log2(77) or approximately 6.25n bits of entropy, and that the
aforementioned 50% of users would be better served by a password
of three randomly generated characters. To better gauge this diffi-
1 viz: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU-
VWXYZ 1234567890!^-=+[]@#$%&*()
[Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.]
culty, observe this set of 8 randomly generated e-character pass-
words:2
tBJ
fZX
evA
8Fy
MHr
=qe
f]w
YxU
We conjecture that most users could readily memorize one of
these.3
Unfortunately, we need to set the target substantially higher.
One standard attack model assumes that attackers will have ac-
cess to encrypted passwords for offline testing, but that the pass-
word encryption scheme will use “key stretching,” a method of re-
lying on expensive-to-compute hashes in order to make checking
passwords—and therefore, guessing passwords—more expensive.
Bonneau and Schechter suggest that under these constraints,
and the further assumption that key-stretching can be increased
to compensate for ever-faster machines, a password with 56 bits
of entropy might well be considered adequate for some time to
come (Bonneau and Schechter 2014).
The most straightforward way to achieve this goal is with ran-
domly generated passwords. That is, users are assigned passwords
by the system, rather than being allowed to choose their own. In
fact, this was standard practice until approximately 1990 (Adams
et al. 1997), when user convenience was seen to to trump security.
Today, the general assumption—evidenced by the lack of sys-
tems using randomly assigned passwords—is that users cannot be
expected to recall secure passwords. Bonneau and Schechter (Bon-
neau and Schechter 2014) challenge this, and describe a study in
which users were recruited for an experiment in which they were
unwittingly learning to type a 56-bit password.4 This experiment
used spaced repetition (Cepeda et al. 2006; Ebbinghaus 1885), and
found that users learned their passwords after a median of 36 logins,
and that three days later, 88% recalled their passwords precisely, al-
though 21% admitted having written them down.
2 Throughout this paper, in the spirit of even-handedness and honesty, we
have been careful to run each example only once, to avoid the tendency to
“cherry-pick” examples that suit our points.
3 Please don’t use these passwords, or any other password printed in this
paper. These passwords are officially toast.
4 Later interviews suggested that some of them might have deduced the
experiment’s true goal.
1 2018/8/24
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
07
78
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
6 F
eb
 20
15
2. How to Randomly Generate Passwords?
If we’re convinced that random passwords are a good idea, and that
recalling a 56-bit password is at least within the realm of possibility,
we must try to find a set of passwords (more specifically, a set of
256 passwords) that are as memorable as possible.
We should acknowledge at the outset that there are many pass-
word schemes that use passwords that are not simply alphanumeric
sequences. We acknowledge the work that’s gone into these ap-
proaches, and we regard these schemes as outside the scope of this
paper.
2.1 Random Characters
The first and most natural system is to generate passwords by
choosing random sequences of characters from a given set, as
described before. In order to see what a 56-bit password might
look like in such a system, consider the following set of eight such
passwords:
Ocd!SG3aU
)u)4OlXt%
tQ$%Xc4Ef
TH9H*kt7^
@f7naKFpx
K+UKdf^7c
S^UhiU#cm
usCGQZ)p-
In this system, a single randomly generated password has an
entropy of 56.4 bits.
Naturally, a different alphabet can be used, and this will affect
memorability. For instance, we use an alphabet containing only one
and zero:
11011111100111010101111100111010100010000110000011110110
10010110011110100010000011001111111000101100110010001001
11101101110001000001011001011110000111000101100001011101
11101001000011010100110010011000111000110011110001010011
00110110011001110011000111001111111011011101010010111000
11001001101011110111101010100100010001110111111111111101
10000101110111100101010111010000111110111010110111100100
11101010100010011010000101010000101010110010110110001001
In this system, each password is 56 characters long, and has
exactly 56 bits of entropy. We conjecture that passwords such as
these would be difficult to memorize.
2.2 RandomWords
Alternatively, many more than six bits can be encoded in each
character, if we take as elements of our alphabet not single letters
but rather words, or syllables.
The first of these, perhaps best known through the "Horse Bat-
tery Staple" XKCD comic (Monroe 2011), suggests that we use a
word list, and choose from a small set of word separators to obtain
a bit of extra entropy. Using the freely available RIDYHEW word
list (Street ???), we can obtain 18.8 bits of entropy for each word,
plus 2 bits for each separator. In order to reach the 56-bit threshold,
we must therefore use three of each, for a total of 62 bits of entropy.
Here are eight examples:
reelman,phymas-quelea;
leapful;bubinga;morsures-
orientalised;liging-isographs-
molecule-charcoallier-foxings,
plaquette.cultivates.agraphobia-
mewsed;gasmasking;pech;
metencephalic.gulf.layoff;
kinematicses-pyknosomes;delineate.
Our observation (at the time of the comic’s release) was that
these sequences did not seem to be substantially nicer than the
simple alphanumeric sequences, due in large part to the use of
words like “pyknosomes,” “quelea,” and “phymas.”
2.3 Random Syllables
A number of other schemes have attempted to split the difference
between random characters and random words by using random
syllables. One such scheme was adopted by the NIST (NIST 1993),
although it was later found to be broken, in that it generated pass-
words with different probabilities (Ganesan and Davies 1994). De-
spite this, it is not difficult to devise a scheme in which all syllables
are equally likely to be generated.
One example of such a scheme is given by Leonhard and
Venkatakrishnan (Leonhard and Venkatakrishnan 2007). They gen-
erate words by choosing from a set of 13 templates, where each
template indicates which characters must be consonants, and which
characters must be vowels. So, for instance, one of the templates
is "abbabbaa", indicating that the first character must be a vowel,
the second two must be consonants, and so forth. Each consonant
is chosen from a fixed set, as is each vowel. The resulting words
have 30.8 bits of entropy; in order to achieve the needed 56, we can
simply choose two of them.
Here are eight such examples:
kuyivavo rastgekoe
phoymasui nupiirji
ifstaezfa ihleophi
stifuyistu apibzaco
iholeyza gohwoopha
ebyexloi stustoijsto
maiwixdi enjujvia
dophaordu ostchichbou
3. Driving Nonuniform Choice using Bit Sources
One characteristic of all of the approaches seen thus far is that they
guarantee that every password is chosen with equal probability, us-
ing a simple approach. Specifically, password generation proceeds
by making a fixed number of choices from a fixed number of a fixed
set of elements.
Specifically, the first scheme generates a password by mak-
ing exactly ten choices from sets of size 77, for all passwords.
The last scheme is also careful to ensure the same number of
vowels and consonants in each template, meaning that password
generation always involves one choice from a set of size 13 fol-
lowed by four choices from a set of size 5 (the vowels) and four
choices from a set of size 22, followed by a second round of each
of these (in order to generate a second word). For all of these
schemes, every possible word is generated with equivalent prob-
ability. This property is crucial, since a system that generates some
passwords with higher probability—such as the scheme adopted by
the NIST (NIST 1993)—means that by focusing on more probable
passwords, attackers can gain leverage.
This approach has a cost, though. In such a scheme, it is not pos-
sible to “favor” certain better-sounding or more-memorable pass-
words by biasing the system toward their selection; such a bias
would increase the probability of certain passwords being gener-
ated, and thereby compromise the system.
3.1 Another Way
However, there is another way of guaranteeing that each pass-
word is generated with equal likelihood. If we can establish a
(computable) bijection between the natural numbers in the range
[0, . . . , N) and a set of passwords, then we can easily guarantee
that each password is generated with equal probability by directly
generating a random natural number, and then mapping it to the
corresponding password.
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Figure 1: distribution of letters following"ca"
In order to make such a scheme work, we must show that
mapping is indeed a bijection, implying that no two numbers map
to the same password.
3.2 Using Bits to Drive a Model
This idea opens up a new way to generate passwords. Rather than
making a sequence of independent choices, we can build a model
that draws randomness from a given sequence of bits. That is, we
first generate a sequence of 56 random bits, and then use this as
a stream of randomness to determine the behavior of a pseudo-
random algorithm. If the stream of bits represents the only source
of (apparent) nondeterminism, then in fact the algorithm is deter-
ministic, and indeed determined entirely by the given sequence of
bits.
Using this approach, we can lift the restriction (all choices must
be equally likely) that has dogged the creation of memorable or
idiomatic-sounding password generators.
Specifically, our chosen non-uniform approach uses a Markov
model, built from Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities. We con-
jecture that this choice is not a critical one.
4. Markov Models
In its simplest form, a Markov modelis simply a nondeterministic
state machine. The model contains a set of states, and a set of
transitions. Each transition has a probability associated with it, and
we have the standard invariant that the sum of the probabilities of
the transitions from the given states sum to one.
For our work, we built markov models from the sequences of
characters5 in Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities (Dickens
1859). One choice that we faced was how many characters to
include in each state. For the sake of the following examples, we
will fix this number at two.
To build the model, then, consider every pair of adjacent charac-
ters in the book. For instance, "ca" is one such pair of characters.
Then, consider every character that follows this pair, and count how
many times each occurs. This generates the distribution shown in
figure 1:
In order to generate idiomatic text from this model, then, we
should observe these distributions. That is, if the last two characters
5 when we say characters, we mean letters in the alphabet, not the fictional
subjects of the novel...
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Figure 2: Huffman tree encoding next-letter choice from state
"ca"
were "ca", the next character should be an "r" with probability
278/1397.
How should we make this choice? One way would be to draw
enough bits (11) from our pool to get a number larger than 1397,
and then, say, pick the letter "r" if the number is less than 278.
Note, though, that while our program will be deterministic (since
it gets its randomness from the stream of given bits), it will not
represent a bijection, since (at least) 278 of the 2048 possible
choices all go to the same state.
To solve this, we need a way of drawing fewer bits to make more
common choices, and drawing more bits to make rarer ones.
Fortunately, this is exactly the problem that Huffman trees
solve!
5. Huffman Trees
Huffman trees (Huffman and others 1952) are generally used in
compression. The basic idea is that we can build a binary tree where
more-common choices are close to the root, and less-common
choices are further from the root.
The standard construction algorithm for Huffman trees proceeds
by coalescing; starting with a set of leaves with weights, we join
together the two least-weighty leaves into a branch whose weight
is the sum of its children. We then continue, until at last we’re left
with just one tree.
As an example, we can consider the distribution given above.
In this case, there are several characters (the comma, the period,
and the colon) that occur just once. We would therefore combine
two of these (the comma and the period, say) into a branch with
weight two and two children, the comma and period leaves. Next,
we would combine the colon (the only tree left with weight one)
with either the "y" or the branch formed in the previous step; each
has weight two. The result would have weight three.
Proceeding in this way, we arrive at the tree shown in figure 2.
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If this tree were to be used in compression, we would represent
the transition to the letter "r" using two bits, a zero and a zero
(if we use zeros to denote left branches). The transition to the next
most likely letter, "l", would be represented as one-zero-one. Note
that less common choices are encoded using larger numbers of bits.
We are not interested in compression, but in generation. For
this use case, we imagine that we are "decoding" the random bit
stream. So, for instance, if the random bit stream contains the bits
(0100110), we would use the first six bits to reach the leaf "c",
and leave the remaining zero in the stream.
Once we’ve reached a character, we may add this character to
the output stream. In order to continue, we must then start again, in
the new state. If, for instance, the "l" were chosen, we would now
be in the state corresponding to the letter pair "al", and we would
begin again.
Consider once more the problem of proving that this is a bijec-
tion. In contrast to the earlier scheme, note that if two bit streams
differ first at (say) bit n, then the character that is output at that
point in the model’s operation is guaranteed to be different. This
ensures that each bit stream corresponds to a different output. To
see the other half of the bijection, we observe that given a model’s
output, we can simply run the "compression" algorithm to obtain
the sequence of bits that generated it.
5.1 Running Out of Bits
One minor complication arises in that the given scheme is not guar-
anteed to end "neatly". That is, the model may have only partially
traversed a huffman tree when the end of the input bit stream is
reached. We can easily solve this by observing the bijection be-
tween streams of 56 randomly generated bits and the infinite stream
of bits whose first 56 bits are randomly generated and whose re-
maining bits are all “zero”, in much the same way that an integer is
not changed by prepending an infinite stream of zeros. This allows
us to implement a bit generator that simply defaults to “zero” when
all bits are exhausted. In fact, the model could continue generating
text, but there’s no need to do so, since the 56 random bits have
already been used.
5.2 The Forbidden state
Can our Markov model get stuck? This can occur if there is a state
with no outgoing transition. Fortunately, the construction of the tree
guarantees there will always be at least one transition... except for
the final characters of the file. If this sequence occurs only once in
the text file, it’s conceivable that the model could get stuck. This
problem can easily be solved, though, by considering the source
document to be “circular,” and adding a transition from the final
state to the file’s initial character.
5.3 Choosing a Markov Model
In our examples thus far, we have chosen to use exactly two char-
acters as the states in the Markov model. This is by no means the
only choice. We can easily use one character, or three or four.
The tradeoff is fairly clear: using shorter character-strings re-
sults in strings that sound less like English, and using longer
character-strings results in strings that more like English. There
is, however, a price; the idiomaticity of the resulting strings results
from a lower "compression", measured in bits per character. That
is, the one-character markov model results in short strings, and
the three- and four-character models result in longer ones. Natu-
rally, all of the given models have the randomness properties we’ve
shown for the two-character ones, and users may certainly choose
a three- or four-character model, if they find that the increase in
memorability compensates for the increase in length.
A final note concerns the selection of the initial state. We’ve
chosen simply to start with the appropriate-length substring of "The
". Naturally, the starting state could be chosen at random, to obtain
slightly shorter strings.
6. Examples
The proof is in the pudding! Let’s see some examples.
First, we generate strings using the one-character Markov
model:
Tenon thempea co ts
Te od " perdy, wil
Thalivares youety
T.) reait dean,
Tr,'ser h Lof owey
Tempr." gedolam,
Te cty se d y Mr,-
Tere th, Fand ry."
These may be seen to be short, but contain challenging se-
quences, such as cty se d y.
Next, strings generated using the two-character Markov model:
Therfur, unappen. So
Therying hant abree,
The cusay is wither?" t
The greed hispefters and
The as obe so yon ters
Thad gre strow; agamo
Thereakentin town ing." "MO
Their, anyte!' hat," "te"
These are slightly longer, but much more pronounceable, and
appear substantially more memorable.
Next, strings generated using the three-character Markov model:
Ther highly to a vice of eart
Then," suspeakings beers ways
They, anythis, int founged mad
They?" "If, who waite any," mul
The moritiour him; businenl
Thensuspellectiver fur
Then him do nown wilty," res
The fix, buse hand, followest."
These are far more English-like, with many actual words. As
a side note, the phrases generated here and in by the prior two-
character model appear almost archaic, with words like "waite,"
"nown," and "yon". Naturally, these are longer than the prior set.
Finally, strings generated using the four-character Markov
model:
The tile fareweloped, and ever p
The shing it nother to delve w
The found, Sydney Carton wreckles Evremonds.
Su
The snorting ever in by turbed t
The receive a year." To appeality a
The back understitch ther's the
The wrong and, here!"--Mr. Calm info
The diffidelicitizen aparticulous timo
At this point, it’s fairly clear what the source is; Sydney Car-
ton appears by name. In addition, you get some fairly interesting
neologisms—in this case, "diffidelicitizen." It’s not a word, but
maybe it should be. Also, we see some people that aren’t actually
in the book, including "Mr. Calm info."
7. Choice of Corpus
Naturally, the choice of A Tale of Two Cities is largely arbitrary; any
corpus of reasonable length will suffice. One intriguing possibility
would be to choose the full text of all of the e-mails in a particular
user’s history. This text would presumably reflect the style of text
that a particular user is accustomed to read and write, and should
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in principle be extraordinarily memorable. Note that the security
of the system is entirely independent of the chosen corpus; our
attack model assumes that the attacker already has the full text of
the corpus.
8. Related Work
There are many, many works that describe passwords. We have
cited Bonneau’s work before, and we will do so again here, as this
work was enormously informative (Bonneau and Schechter 2014).
We have also already described the work contained in many other
related projects (Leonhard and Venkatakrishnan 2007; NIST 1993).
To our knowledge, however, there is no other work that uses a bit
source to drive huffman decoding to drive a markov model, thereby
enabling generation of pronounceable text without the (heretofore)
attendant lack of equi-probability.
9. Future Work
There’s a giant piece of future work here: specifically, we wave
our hands and suggest that our passwords are more memorable
than those generated by other schemes. Naturally, a claim like this
cannot simply be taken as true; we must conduct a test to verify this
claim.
We are currently building the tools to allow us to conduct this
study.
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